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NOTES
Civil Rights -The Test of Democratic Fiber
The life of the Negro race has been a life of tragedy, of injustice, of op-
pression. The law has made him an equal, but man has not. And,
after all, the last analysis is, what has man done? - and not what has
the law done?l
This, from Clarence Darrow's final argument to the jury in the famous
Sweet case' in 1926 in Chicago, -is a statement for the time; a truth which
covers a century of American history.
During our nation's growth, problems have arisen from time to time
which have challenged a most basic concept of our constitutional system
- equal justice for all people under the law. In some parts of our
country we are again faced with such problems. Unfortunately, the
chronology of yearbooks in too many a high school library will display a
gap indicating the "lost class of '59" - permanent mute testimony to
this abrasion to the fabric of democracy. Decisions of the federal courts
determining the legal rights of Negro school children are being met with
resistance in a few areas. Continued resistance cannot fail to damage our
governmental fabric and the standing of our nation in every corner of the
world. Thus are our public educational problems of urgent concern to
all of us. The -issue resolves itself to the question of determining the
role of a Supreme Court decision itself in our society - whether this
pronouncement of the highest judicial body is supreme or whether it
may be evaded and defied? It is the purpose of this note to study the
issues presented by the school segregation cases and study the skills of
compromise employed by the federal judges to secure the democratic
principle of equality as an actual practice rather than a theoretical con-
cept - a prerequisite for democracy's survival in today's world arena.
HISTORY OF "SEPARATE BuT EQUAL"
Racial segregation in public schools dates back to the beginnings of
public education in the United States. Segregation was voluntarily
abolished in most states of the union, but it remained the unifom and
established practice in the schools of the South. In fact, any law designed
to segregate persons of different races in the location of their homes, in
the public schools and on public conveyances has been a prolific source
1. WENBERG, ATrORNEY FOR THE DAMNED 233 (1957).
2. Id. at 229. Dr. Sweet, a Negro, had purchased a house in a "white district" of
Chicago. A large mob surrounded the house the first night the Sweets occupied
their new residence. The second night even a larger mob gathered, and, for some
unexplained reason, a shot was fired from the house. One of the mob was killed.
Dr. Sweet, his family, and those of his friends who were in the house (eleven in all)
were arrested and charged with first degree murder. None was convicted.
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of litigation. The staunch position for segregation was first argued to
be violative of the equal protection clause of the United States Constitu-
tion.3 This argument was met by the "Separate but Equal" doctrine
which, though invented prior to the adoption of the fourteenth amend.
ment4 and in a state court,5 seemed most appropriate. The United States
Supreme Court adopted the doctrine in 18966 when it held a state statute
providing for separate but equal accommodations on railroads for white
and colored persons not to be a denial to the colored man of the equal
protection of the law required 'by the fourteenth amendment.
To the colored man fifty years ago even the protective aspect of the
"Separate but Equal" doctrine appeared dismal when the action of a local
board of education in temporarily suspending a high school for colored
children because of economic reasons was held not to be sufficient reason
for restraining the board from maintaining an existing high school for
white children7 - so long as the board had not proceeded in bad faith
and had not acted in hostility to the colored race.
Yet "Separate but Equal" was to be with us a long time. As late as
1927 a child of Chinese ancestry, who was a citizen of the United States,
was deemed not to have been denied equal protection of the law by be-
ing assigned to a public school for colored children, when equal facilities
for education was offered to both races.' But from 1938 on, through a
variety of oblique references in other cases, the Justices intimated that
the days of segregated public schools were numbered. It 'became in-
creasingly apparent that the Court was prepared to prohibit segregation
as a violation of "equal protection of the laws"9 to all persons.
The beginning of the new attitude was evidenced in the Court's in-
clination to review more critically both the tangible and intangible fac-
tors of the cases brought before it to ascertain whether equality was being
offered. Possibly because it was felt that less resistance would be en-
countered, the new approach was applied first to cases involving institu-
tions of higher learning. In Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada° the
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV: "No State shall.., deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
4. Secretary Seward certified without reservation that the amendment was part of
the Constitution on July 21, 1868.
5. Roberts v. Boston, 59 Mass. 198, 206 (1849): "Conceding ... that colored per-
sons ... are entitled by law ... to equal rights, constitutional and political, civil and
social, the question then arises whether ... separate schools for colored children is a
violation of any of these rights." The court held there to be no violation.
6. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
7. Cumming v. Board of Education, 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
8. Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
10. 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
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Supreme Court held that the state was denying the equal protection of its
laws to Negroes in failing to provide a legal education for them com-
parable to that afforded white students. In a later case the state of Okla-
homa was obliged to provide a legal education for a qualified Negro
applicant as soon as it did for applicants of any other group.'1 This
mandate became more than mere verbiage when the state court entered
an order requiring, in the alternative, the admission of a Negro to the
state maintained law school or nonenrolment of any other applicant until
a separate school with equal educational facilities should be provided for
Negroes. The culmination of this new trend was manifested in the
Sweatt v. Pinter'2 decision. In that case, after a close examination of the
facts, the Court concluded that the legal education offered in a separate
law school for Negroes was inferior to that -being offered -by the Univer-
sity of Texas Law School and hence the equal protection clause required
that a qualified applicant 'be admitted to the latter.
THE DEMISE OF THE SEPARATE BUT EQUAL DOCTRINE
When, therefore, the contention that "equal protection of the laws"
prohibited any form of segregation was brought before the Court in
19 5 2 1L by certain southern Negroes on behalf of their children and of
others similarly situated, the big problem was not whether to declare
segregation unconstitutional, but how to proceed to do so. There was
no secret about the impassioned opposition of the state and local authori-
ties and of substantial segments of the populace in the southern states.
The educational structure and deep seated habits of a whole region were
involved.
Both "law" and "logic" seemed to dictate that enforcement of segre-
gation must either be constitutional or unconstitutional. There seemed
to be no possibility for a middle ground. In the two years that passed
until the decision was finally announced on May 17, 1954, the public
mind had had adequate opportunity to prepare for the discarding of the
old rule of "Separate but Equal." Some people may have been shocked
at the unanimity of the Coures decision, but all should have been aware
that this showed implicitly that the Court had discovered that elusive
"middle ground."
THE ADAPTABLE MANDATE
As one would expect, the bulk of the opinion was devoted to demon-
strating that segregation was unconstitutional and that various earlier
statements to the contrary were, for one reason or another, either irrele-
11. Sipuelv. Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 78 (1927).
12. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
13. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1953).
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vant or no longer binding on the Court. Thus, on principle, segregation
in public schools was condemned to death. The greatest hurdle remained:
How to effectuate the difficult and complex transition from segregated
to unsegregated schools? The Court had arrived at a threefold solution:
(1) interested parties (not only "parties" to the suit, -but also the At-
torney General of the United States and the Attorneys General of all
states requiring or permitting racial discrimination in public education)
were invited to participate in recommending and framing a suitable pro-
cedure and were allowed several more months for a cooling period; (2)
the procedure to be adopted must be flexible enough to permit con-
sideration of varying local needs and conditions; and, (3) perhaps by
far the most important, the plan must allow for "an effective gradual
adjustment."1 4 A wedge of duration had been inserted between the im-
mediate "either-or." Without the use of such a temporal dimension the
alternative results seemed inexorible. A method for gradual transition
had been devised which could accommodate both the required change in
regional mores and the Negroes' generic rights. Obviously, racial adjust-
ment will require time, but the use of time is equally as -important as its
availability. Time can prove to be either an ally or an enemy. Bacon
recognized its importance as an ally when 'he stated:
In all negotiations of difficulty, a man may not look to sow and reap at
once; but must prepare business, and so ripen it by degrees.' 5
Time used as a cloak to achieve complete defiance can, however, be an
elusive enemy.
To better understand the tempering effects of temporal dimension
decisions, it is 'important to understand the respective roles of State and
Nation.
THE STATE'S IGHTS ARGUMENT AGAINST INTEGRATION
Admittedly, equality under the law is a national concept rooted in the
nation's Constitution. Its fulfillment can not be a violation of the rights
of any state. Nevertheless, one of the most deceptive arguments which
has been advanced by the segregationists is that the federal government
is improperly interfering with the operation of the local school systems.
The argument begins with the appeal that the issue transcends race. That
it strikes at the heart of every right reserved to the people under a gov-
ernment based on a constitution that delegates to the central government
certain well-defined powers and reserves to the states and the people all
14. Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 298 (1954).
15. BACON, Of Negotiation in ESSAYS AND NEw ATLANTIs 200 (1942).
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powers not specifically so delegated. Virginia's Governor Almond co-
gently summarized the argument:
[T]he Supreme Court of the United States has ignored the Ninth,
the Tenth and the Fourteenth amendments ... to rule that the States
have no authority to operate their schools as they see fit and, on the con-
trary, can operate them only if they adopt the sociological and psycho-
logical views of the nine men who happen today to constitute the Court.
I do not concede an opinion of the Supreme Court to be the law of
the land. If I did, I would be ...guilty of displaying lack of respect
for the Constitution. . . The Constitution itself provides and specifies
what shall constitute the law of the land. It does not embrace judicial
opinions which change with the winds.16
Of course, public education, as the Supreme Court explicitly recog-
nized,17 is a primary concern of the states. But, all state action must be
exercised consistently with the federal constitutional requirements as they
apply to state action.18 The applicable constitutional requirement is the
provision of the fourteenth amendment, as Governor Almond points out,
with a somewhat different emphasis;19 specifically, "No state shall ...
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.' 20
In a long line of decisions prior to the school cases, the Supreme
Court, in a variety of situations, gave concrete meaning to this command
of the Constitution. For example, it set aside convictions of Negroes by
state juries from which Negroes had been systematically excluded. 21 The
states involved did not seriously contend that the Supreme Court was
thereby trying to run their jury system. The Court also struck down licens-
ing laws which were administered so as to exclude persons of Oriental
16. Address by Governor J. Lindsay Almond, Jr. of Virginia at The Virginia Farm
Bureau Federation Convention in Richmond, November 24, 1958. Reported in
U.S. News & World Report, Dec. 5, 1958, p. 75.
17. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1953).
18. In determining what constitutes "state action" the courts have consistently held
that a state and its instrumentalities cannot avoid their constitutional obligations by
turning public facilities over to private corporations for operation on a segregated
basis. Simkins v. City of Greensboro, 149 F. Supp. 562 (M.D. N.C. 1957), a!f'd,
246 F.2d 425 (4th Cir. 1957) (golf course); Derringon v. Plummer, 240 F.2d
922 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 838 (1957) (county cafeteria); Vir-
ginia Dept. of Conservation & Development v. Tate, 231 F.2d 615 (4th Cir. 1956)
(state park); Lawrence v. Hancock, 76 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D. W. Va. 1948)
(swimming pool).
19. Governor Almond urged: "The Fourteenth Amendment, with its 'equal pro-
tection of the laws' clause, specifies that the Congress shall have power to enforce the
article 'by appropriate legislation.' This power resides in the Congress and not in
the courts."
20. U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV.
21. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
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ancestry from certain occupations. 22 The states involved did not argue
that the federal government was attempting to take over their legitimate
licensing functions. On the contrary, they recognized the unconstitution-
ality of the discriminatory practices.
There is no more reason to argue that the federal government is
interfering with the rights of the states in the field of public education.
A state is completely free to work out, as it chooses, a public school sys-
tem - teacher selection, curriculum, all of the elements which go into
a school system and its management are, as they have always been, the
affair of the state and local authorities2 3 The Supreme Court has never
suggested otherwise. It merely held that a state violates the Constitution
of the United States when it denies to a Negro child who is otherwise
qualified for admission to a particular school, and who seeks admission,
the right to enter that school.
In our system of government the Constitution is, of course, the or-
ganic law, and it has -become the function of the judiciary to interpret it.
This is the very cornerstone of our federal system. As Hamilton stressed
in The Federalist2 4 "the want of a judiciary power was the circumstance
which crown[ed] the defects of the [Articles of] Confederation." These
difficulties were obviated in the words of Chief Justice Stone, "by making
the Constitution the supreme law of the land and leaving its interpreta-
tion to the courts."2 5 The unanimous decision of the Court in the Brown
case thus represents the "law of the land" today, tomorrow, and for the
future. However, the opposition and resentment caused by this decision
is much more serious, widespread, and deep-seated than that caused by
any court decision in recent times. This undoubtedly prompted the recog-
nition that a period of transition would be required and fathered the
test requiring that the method of change and the length of time be ac-
complished at "all deliberate speed"26 with due regard to varying local
conditions. The exact methods were left to the local school boards under
the supervision of the federal courts. The crux of the matter is one of
intention. The problems are difficult at best but they become hazardous
if the underlying intent of those who are opposed to the decision of the
Court is one of defiance. Particularly if those in official position are
opposed to the decision. Although the executive branch does not assist
22. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1885).
23. Accord, Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1938), where a similar question arose
as to state control over election machinery. The court held that though the state has
full control over elections it does not follow that it may adopt a scheme of registra-
tion which is subtly calculated to disfranchise voters of a particular race.
24. No. 22, at 138 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937).
25. LAw AND iTs ADMINISTATION 138 (1924).
26. Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1954).
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in formulating any details of the plan, there have been a few instances in
which that branch has participated in court actions, not in connection
with the proposed de-segregation plan, but in order to assure respect for
law and order and for the decrees of the United States district courts.
EXYECUTVE INTERvENTON
One instance of executive participation in the enforcement of orders
of a federal court involved a situation which arose in Clinton, Ten-
nesseeP2 In compliance with a court order, a number of Negroes had
been admitted, without incident, to the Clinton High School. Several days
later, John Kasper, an agitator for the Seabord White Citizens Council,
arrived to organize concerted obstruction. His purpose was to frustrate
the district court's order and to exert pressure upon the school board to
dismiss the Negro students. At the petition of the members of the
school board, the court enjoined Kasper from further hindering or ob-
structing the approved plan. Kasper -refused to comply and continued to
incite mob action aimed at subverting the court's decree. He was there-
upon charged with criminal contempt, again at the instance of the school
board members. At this point the United States Attorney, who had not
been in the case since it 'involved predominantly a local question of
formulating an appropriate plan of integration, was requested by the court
to participate in the investigation and prosecution of the criminal con-
tempt charges. This was done and Kasper was convicted and the con-
viction was sustained on appeal.
Another example of executive participation to help overcome violent
interference with a plan of integration is the Hoxie case.2 s Promptly
after the Supreme Court's decision, the Hoxie school board, finding no
administrative obstacle to immediate de-segregaion, announced that the
schools in that district would be open to white and colored alike. This
was met by threats and acts of violence designed to coerce the school
board to rescind its action. The board and its members responded by an
action in the federal district court to enjoin the agitators from threaten-
ing or intimidating the school board members in the performance of
their duties. The injunction was granted, but the defendants appealed
on the grounds that no federal rights were involved and that the federal
courts therefore had no jurisdiction. The appeal thus raised the broad
question whether the state officials can be protected in the federal courts
from interference with their performance of a duty 'imposed upon them
by the federal Constitution. Because of the effect the decision would
27. Kasper v. Brittain, 245 F.2d 92 (6th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 834
(1957).
28. Hoxie School District v. Brewer, 137 F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Ark. 1956).
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have upon the procedures available for dealing with the obstructions to
duly adopted plans of de-segregation, the United States, at the request of
the school board and with the consent of all parties, appeared and filed
a brief in the court of appeals in support of the power of the federal
courts. The injunction was affirmed.29
The general policy of the federal government is to regard the matter
of formulating an appropriate remedial plan as the responsibility of the
local litigants and the local court. On the other hand, if there is con-
certed and substantial interference, as in the Kasper case, with the decree
of the court, the government stands prepared to take such steps as may
be necessary to vindicate the court's authority. As, for example, aiding
the court in prosecuting a contempt charge. Other assistance also seems
available - as in the Hoxie case, where, at the request of the local school
board, the government submitted its views on an important question in-
volving the formulation of an effective federal procedure for dealing
with threatened obstruction of law and order.
The most serious situation arises when a state impedes the execution
of a court's final decree in one of two ways: (1) under the guise of pre-
venting disorder, it uses state military forces in a manner calculated to
obstruct a final order of the court,30 or (2) it fails to provide adequate
police protection to those whose rights have been determined by final
decree of the court and as a result "domestic violence, unlawful com-
bination or conspiracy" 3' hinders the exercise of those rights
32
When a group of private persons engages in a concerted effort to
29. Brewer v. Hoxie School District, 238 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1956).
30. Aaron v. Cooper, 156 F. Supp. 220, 225 (E.D. Ark. 1957). The Governor of
Arkansas dispatched National Guard troops to Central High School and placed the
school "off limits" to colored students. "[No crowds ... and no acts... or threats
of violence ... had occurred. The Mayor, the Chief of Police, and the school au-
thorities had made no request to the Governor nor any representative of his for State
assistance .... Such action seems to have been entirely unwarranted. The guards-
men, "acting pursuant to the Governor's order, stood shoulder to shoulder and there-
by forcibly prevented the nine Negro students... from entering."
31. 10 U.S.C. § 333 (1956): "The President, by using the militia or the armed
forces, or both, or by any other means, shall take such measures as he considers
necessary to suppress in a state, any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful com-
bination, or conspiracy...."
32. Faubus v. United States, 254 F.2d 797 (8th Cir. 1958). The court determined
that the Little Rock School Board's plan had been obstructed by the Governor
through the use of National Guard troops, and granted a preliminary injunction on
September 20, 1957. The troops were accordingly withdrawn and the Negro chil-
dren entered the school Monday, September 23, 1957, under the protection of the
Little Rock Police Department and the Arkansas State Police. The officers had
difficulty controlling the demonstrative crowd which gathered during the morning
and consequently removed the children from the school. See Aaron v. Cooper, 163
F. Supp. 13 (E.D. Ark. 1958), for a more complete factual presentation.
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obstruct the execution of a court decree, application for an injunction
and, if necessary, the institution of contempt proceedings, will ordinarily
prove effective. This is illustrated by the Kasper case. In Clinton, Ten-
nessee, however, there had been no breakdown of local law enforcement
machinery. Local authorities stood ready, able, and willing to prevent
violence and to protect the individual citizen. If local law enforcement
breaks down and mob rule supplants state authority, the situation is im-
measurably more serious. In that situation, it may -be enough to go back
to the courts for further relief in the form of an injunction, a process
which is necessarily time consuming - a mob doesn't always wait.
The maintenance of order in the local community is the primary re-
sponsibility of the stateP3  When a court, either state or federal, has
entered a decree, the state has a duty not to impede its execution. More
than that it has the affirmative responsiblity of maintaining law and or-
der so that the rights of individuals, as determined by the courts, are
protected against violence and lawlessness. What if the state fails to
meet this responsibility? It means that persons who oppose the decisions
of the court, if they can muster enough force, can set the court's decree
at naught. If this occurs can there be equivocation?34  President Eisen-
hower has clearly stated:
The very basis of our individual rights and freedoms rests upon the cer-
tainty that the President and the Executive Branch of government will
support and insure the carrying out of the decisions of the federal
courts.3 5
Each state, granting the will, is generally capable of maintaining law
and order within the state, and at the same time permitting a final decree
of the court to be effected. Therefore, no further occasion need arise
which would require the federal government, by the executive branch, to
act to support and insure the carrying out of a final decision of a federal
court
33. Thornhill v. State of Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 105 (1940): "The power and
the duty of the state to take adequate steps to preserve the peace and to protect the
privacy, the lives, and the property of its residents cannot be doubted."
34. On September 25, 1957, the President dispatched federal troops to effect ad-
mission of the Negro students. Regular Army troops remained until November 27,
1957, and were replaced by federalized National Guardsmen who were stationed
there for the balance of the school year. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
Because there appears to be some doubt as to the federal courts' ability under 18
U.S.C. 5 1503 to cite members of a "mob," who are not specifically named in the
court order, with contempt, Title I of H. R. 4457, in committee for the first session
of the 86th Congress, would make it a federal offense willfully to use force or threats
of force to obstruct court orders in school de-segregation cases. Upon conviction the
offender could be punished by fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for
not more than two years, or both.
35. N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1957, p. 14, col. 3.
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In any civilization based upon ordered liberty, it is fundamental, in
the words of John Locke, a favored philosopher of the founding fathers,
that "no man in a civil society can be exempted from the laws of it. '3'
It follows that no man can 'be excepted from the requirement of re-
specting the lawfully determined rights of others. The answer lies with
responsible state officials37
COMPLIANCE WITH THE MANDATE
What course or courses then are being followed allegedly to comply
with the integration mandate?
Obviously, imposed solutions are much less satisfactory than voluntary
ones. That which is imposed tends to accentuate tensions; it may leave a
residue of resentment - both on the part of those who feel that too
much is being required too soon, and on the part of those that feel that
too little is being done too slowly.
On the other hand, where the individual citizens and the responsible
officials have frankly faced the facts and have proceeded in good faith to
formulate their own plans and go forward with them, confusion and dis-
order have largely been avoided and substantial progress has been made.
On Monday, February 2, 1959, for the first time in the history of the
Commonwealth of Virginia, Negro children walked through the open
doors of public schools to sit down in class room with white children.
This was a milestone. The State of Virginia had adopted legislation38
36. LOcKE, Of Political or Civil Society in Two TREATISES OF GovERNMENT 168
(1947).
37. No state legislator or executive can war against the Constitution without violat-
ing his oath "to support this Constitution" taken pursuant to U.S. CoNsT. art VI, § 3.
In Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 397-98 (1932), the court decided if a
governor had the power to nullify a federal court order "it is manifest that the fiat
of a state governor, not the Constitution of the United States, would be the supreme
law of the land .. " Similarly, in United States v. Peters, 9 U. S. (5 Cranch) 115,
136 (1809), the court said: "If the legislatures of the several states may, at will,
annul the judgments of the courts of the United States, and destroy the rights ac-
quired under those judgments, the Constitution itself becomes a solemn mock-
ery ....
38. VA. CODE3 ANN. §§ 22-188.3-.49 (Cum. Supp. 1958). The gist of that legis-
lation being that "all elementary and secondary public schools in which both white
and colored children are enrolled are, upon the happening of that event automatically
dosed, removed from the public school system, and placed under the control of the
Governor. All State appropriations for the support and maintenance of such schools
are cut off and withheld from them. Such State funds so withheld ... are to be used
for the payment of tuition grants in nonsectarian private schools of children who
have been attending such public schools, who cannot be assigned to other public
schools, and whose parents or custodians desire that they do not attend schools in
which both white and colored children are enrolled and taught. Schools which may
be policed under federal authority, or disturbed by such policing are, upon the hap-
pening of that event, likewise automatically dosed, and .... tuition grants are made




which had the avowed purpose of avoiding and preventing the very occur-
rence which was taking place. That legislation proceeded from the un-
tenable premise that somehow it was possible, consistent with the law
as declared -by the Supreme Court of the United States, to continue a
policy of racial segregation in the public schools. Further anti-integra-
tion legislation may be in the offing, but the judicial order was effected
without incident. This can only be attributed to the "responsibility" of
Virginia's Governor Almond. He is admittedly in disagreement with the
rulings by state and federal courts and abhors the idea of integration in
the public schools, but his "responsibility" is evidenced by his comment
that
whatever may ensue ... law and order must prevail to the end that the
good name and honor of Virginia be not defamed. With fairness and
impartiality to all, I am determined to keep the peace and good order 3 9
The pivotal decision leading to Virginia's integration was the James
case.40 This was a suit instituted on behalf of white Norfolk children
who had been shut out of the public schools in consequence of Virginia's
school-dosing laws. The court ruled that it was unconstitutional for a
state to dose schools on a selective basis; i.e., to close down only those
schools in which it has -been ordered that Negro children be admitted
while continuing to operate other schools not subject to a similar order.
On the very same day that the Jams case was decided in a federal court,
the state supreme court reached a decision of far-reaching importance in
the Harrison case.41 That court decided that Virginia's school-dosing
and related laws could not be squared with the requirements of the Vir-
ginia Constitution that the "general assembly shall establish and main-
tain an efficient system of public free schools throughout the State."42
This decision underscores the importance which the people of Virginia
have attached, and which a democratic people can scarcely fail to attach,
to the general availability of public schooling. If the James case makes
it dear that if a state is to operate a public schooling system at all it must
do so in compliance with the requirements of the United States Constitu-
tion, the Harrison case highlights what an indispensable place the insti-
tution of the public school has come to occupy. It must be noted that
39. Akron Beacon Journal, Feb. 3, 1959, p. 6, col. 1.
40. James v. Almond, 170 F. Supp. 331 (E.D. Va. 1959). One last attempt to
resist the inevitable is disclosed by James v. Duckworth, 170 F. Supp. 342 (E.D.
Va. 1959), wherein the court enjoined enforcement of an ordinance and two reso-
lutions which were adopted with the avowed purpose of canceling appropriations to
integrated schools.
41. Harrison v. Day, 106 S.E.2d 636 (Va. 1959).
42. VA. CONST. § 129.
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this start made in Virginia took place without the necessity of interven-
tion by the Executive branch of the federal government.
But this does not mean that mass integration will now blanket the
South. Still a new evasive tack has been initiated which, to date, has
received the sanction of the federal courts. This mode of resistance has
been termed the School Placement Law.43  Alabama enacted this law in
1955 with the design of establishing some standards other than race as
a measure for placing children in school. By the specific provisions of
this law some seventeen standards 4 can be applied by school boards in
determining placement of pupils in schools. Race is not one of the
mentioned criteria. The validity of this law was attacked when four
Negro children in Birmingham sought to have the courts rule on its con-
stitutionality in the light of the Brown decision. The federal district
court4 5 concluded that the law was constitutional on its face. In the
words of the court:
The School Placement Law furnishes the legal machinery for an orderly
administration of the public schools in a constitutional manner by the
admission of qualified pupils upon a basis of individual merit without
regard to their race or color. We must presume that it will be so ad-
ministered. 46
The United States Supreme Court, in a one paragraph decision, af-
43. Act No. 201 of the Legislature of Alabama, Regular Session 1955, which be-
came an Act on August 3, 1955, as amended by Act No. 367, Regular Session 1957,
which became an Act on August 26, 1957; GENERAL AcTs OF ALABAMA 1955, p.
492, as amended by GENERAL Acrs 1957, p. 482.
44. Act No. 367, Regular Session 1957, § 4: "In the assignment, transfer or con-
tinuance of pupils among and within the schools, or within the classroom and other
facilities thereof, the following factors and the effect or results thereof shall be con-
sidered, with respect to the individual pupil, as well as other relevant matters: [1]
Available room and teaching capacity of the various schools, [2] Availability of
transportation facilities, [3] The effect of the admission of new pupils upon estab-
lished or proposed academic programs, [4] Suitability of established curricula for
particular pupils, [5] Adequacy of the pupil's academic preparation for admission
to a particular school and curriculum, [6] The scholastic aptitude and relative intelli-
gence or mental energy or ability of the pupil, [7] The psychological qualification
of the pupil for the type of teaching and associations involved, [8] Effect of admis-
sion of the pupil upon the academic progress of other students in a particular school
or facility thereof, [9] Effect of admission upon the prevailing academic standards
in a particular school, [10] The psychological effect upon the pupil of attendance
at a particular school, [11] The possibility or threat of friction or disorder among
the pupils or others, [12] The possibility of breaches of the peace or ill-will or
economic retaliation within the community, £13] The home environment of the
pupil, [14] The maintenance or severance of established social and psychological
relationships with other pupils and with teachers, [15] Choice and interest of the
pupil, [16] Moral conduct, health and personal standards of the pupil, [17] The
request or consent of parents or guardian and the reason assigned therefor."
45. Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Board of Education, 162 F. Supp. 372 (N.D.
Ala. 1958).
46. Id. at 384.
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firmed the decision "upon grounds on which the District Court rested
its decision. 4 7  The failure of the Birmingham Board of Education to
honor the requests of four Negro pupils for assignment to white schools
was thereby not questioned by the Supreme Court. The law is valid.
Only the question of its application remains. Each child wishing to ap-
peal to a federal court to test a school board decision will be required to
bring a separate suit as to the merits of that specific application. With-
out a reconsideration by the United States Supreme Court, the best that
can be hoped for will be a case by case series of trials through a chain
of courts resulting in, at most, token integration with little or no erosion
to the effective substance of the Alabama statute.
It is true that the fourteenth amendment does not affirmatively command
integration, -but the Supreme Court has made it clear that the amend-
ment does forbid any state action requiring segregation. Has then the
wedge of temporal accommodation been inserted too deeply to compel
compliance with the order for de-segregation without further judicial
declaration? Probably yes, but this should not detract from the useful
role it has played in creating a period of adjustment; a period marked by
progress in the communities where compliance is the intent; but a period
marked by treadmilling where evasion is the intent.
If the Alabama School Placement Law is designed as a camouflage
to continue segregation the result of its use will display the empirical
knowledge necessary to ascertain such a purpose. There can be no doubt
that the United States Supreme Court would, and should, then declare
the law unconstitutional in its application.
CONCLUSION
Of all the weapons in the arsenal of the free world, the most potent
is the dedication of free nations to the basic concept of justice, morality,
and the rule of law. Above all others, the one thing that distinguishes
free nations from totalitarian regimes is the importance attached to the
rights of every individual. By contrast we need only look behind the Iron
Curtain to see how little value and protection there is for the individual
in the mere cold words written on parchment. The people under the
Soviet rule have many substantial rights expressly granted to them by
written constitution, many of them strikingly similar to ours. For ex-
ample, freedom of speech 48 and of the press49 are 'listed as rights guaran-
teed in the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. The same is true of the right
47. Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Board of Education, 358 U.S. 101 (1958).
48. U.S.S.R. CONsT. ch. X, art. 125 (a).
49. U.S.S.R. CONST. ch. X, art. 125(b).
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of assembly for peaceful purposes.50 The Soviet Constitution proclaims
the independence of the judiciary,51 and recognizes the right to freedom of
religious worship.5 2 Yet it is dear that these written principles are merely
deceptive devices. Whenever the interests of the state are involved,
justice behind the Iron Curtain becomes synonymous with what the
leaders decide. Under such a system the rights of the individuals of
necessity are of subordinate importance. Isn't then one of the greatest
weaknesses of the Soviet system that it places so very little value on the
individual's rights and liberties?
This fact must be remembered in the days ahead. In an effort to
detract attention from their own shortcomings, the Soviet leaders will
continually seek to exploit out of all proportion the slightest shortcom-
ing they can find in our system of justice. The challenge of our time is
how to demonstrate to the whole world that our system of government,
not just in theory but in fact, actually provides meaningful justice to all
individuals under all circumstances. We cannot hope to persuade the
people of the world that our system holds forth the greatest hope for
individual freedom and opportunity if by our actions at home we fall
short of the mark in matters relating to race relations. Equality before
the law is the hallmark of democracy. This principle finds deep roots in
our constitutional system. It is the very essence of the rule of law. We
can ill afford not to give substance to this basic concept of justice to all
our people.
The peoples of the world are not going to be satisfied with the glow-
ing promises painted on dry parchment by empty words. Only the dis-
cernible threads of mettle woven into the fabric of democracy shall make
it the material demanded for the world's governmental raiment.
JACK L. RENNER
50. U.S.S.R. CoNsT. ch. X, art. 125 (c).
51. U.S.S.R- CONsT. ch. IX, art. 112: 'The judges are independent and shall be
subordinate only to the law."
52. U.S.S.R. CONST. ch. X, art. 124: "In order to ensure to citizens freedom of
conscience, the church in the USSR shall be separated from the state, and the school
from the church. Freedom of religious worship and freedom of anti-religious propa-
ganda shall be recognized for the citizens."
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